Battle of Bean's Station

BEAN STATION TAVERN

 Built 1814

 Following the repulse at Fort Sanders Longstreet was informed that a Union relief column had been sent from the victorious Union army at Chattanooga. The Confederate troops were held in their lines around Knoxville as bait to draw Sherman away from Bragg’s retreating army. A staged withdraw began on December 3rd. Units on the west of the city were shifted to the east and the entire force moved off to the northeast on the night of the 4th. Burnside reported the departure and the bulk of the relief troops returned to Chattanooga. Only Granger’s corps continued on to join the defenders at Knoxville.

On the 5th the Union mindset changed from defense to pursuit. MG Parke was given command of the chase but the first efforts were hampered the condition of his cavalry. “The few cavalry we could mount…were in such bad condition as to be unable to make any great impression on the enemy.” BG J.M. Shackelford started after the Confederate Army with a mixed task force of cavalry and infantry on the 7th after a short period of consolidation and reorganization. From the 7th to the 13th the pursuers kept a respectful distance, having been ordered by Parke “not to attack with the force I came out with.” A series of skirmishes marked the chase, the most important occurring on the 10th at Morristown. BG Garrard, out on a scout of the Rogersville Road, avenged his earlier defeat there by attacking the Confederate cavalry. It “was a gallant affair” with “40 or 50 rebels reported killed or wounded.” After the fight the Union cavalry gathered at their headquarters at Bean’s Station.

The Union cavalry had moved well in advance of their infantry support and Longstreet sensed an opportunity. The Confederate leader reversed his direction of march with an eye on destroying the Federals located at Bean’s Station.

On the morning of the 14th BG Bushrod Johnson’s division moved down the Rutledge Road fronted by 100 cavalry troopers from Giltner’s Brigade. Initial contact was made with the Federal skirmishers about three miles east of Bean’s Station at 1400. Seven companies of the 59th Alabama were advanced as skirmishers and began the slow process of pushing the Union troopers back. At a ½ mile from the station the 43rd Alabama extended the Confederate line and advanced on the main Union position. Well placed artillery drove them to the ground and the Confederate guns were brought up to begin dueling with the Union pieces. Parker’s Virginia Battery and Taylor’s Virginia Napoleons battled the Federal gunners for the rest of the day. Parker’s guns reportedly fired 375 rounds during the engagement.

While the batteries fought amongst themselves Johnson’s Brigade pressed forward in a line of battle while McLaw’s men attempted to turn the enemy’s left. Gracie’s Alabama Brigade led the way with the 60th Alabama out front. The move was met by heavy fire coming from the large hotel building at the station and the men were forced to lie down. Artillery was diverted from the counter battery fire onto the hotel. Unfortunately the hotel stables, occupied by men of the 60th Alabama, were struck and 2 men killed and 3 others wounded. Eventually the Union troops were compelled to evacuate the hotel leaving several wounded soldiers in the basement to be captured. Johnson then called on Jenkins (Hood’s) Division for assistance. An effort was made to flank the right of the Federal line, but the move was detected and Shackelford had his men retreat into the night.

The next morning Longstreet hoped to push the Union troops into a trap. MG William Martin was supposed to circle the Union position at Bean’s Station and take up blocking positions with his cavalry to thwart any Federal retreat. Martin met unexpectedly tough resistance from “a brigade of cavalry” at May’s Ford. The stubborn Federal troopers were finally driven away from the river by “rapid fire” from White’s Tennessee and Wiggin’s Arkansas batteries. The next morning the enemy pickets were driven off the ford and the crossing made. The lost time, however, could not be made up and Martin did not gain the correct position. As a result the Union cavalry was allowed to fall back on their infantry support and assume an entrenched position. Longstreet declined to attack the entrenched enemy and the Battle of Bean’s Station was over. The Confederate losses totaled 900 while the Union defenders suffered slightly less with 700 casualties. Retreat and skirmishing lasted for two additional weeks before Longstreet and his men were allowed to make winter camp. The spring would see them return to Virginia’s battlefields.

ASSAULT ON FORT SANDERS

"Fort Sanders"

The original plan for the assault on the Federal position at Fort Sanders called for the improvised mortars to open at sunrise on the 25th followed by the direct fire guns. Sharpshooters were to seize the advanced Union rifle pits and keep up a deadly fire on the embrasures to mask the approach of the main attack force. While all these preparations were in the works Longstreet learned that Bragg had succumbed to his appeal for reinforcements. Bragg had decided to reinforce him with two divisions from around Chattanooga. The bulk of the planned movement was recalled when the fight for Missionary Ridge exploded in the midst of the deployment. Longstreet decided to postpone the attack awaiting the promised reinforcements. Johnson’s and Gracie’s brigades began to arrive at Knoxville late on the 2Accompanying these troops was BG Leadbetter, Bragg’s Chief Engineer. On Friday November 26th Leadbetter, Longstreet, and E. P. Alexander conducted a reconnaissance of the area north of Knoxville in hopes of finding an area better suited or the assault. After Wheeler’s cavalry drove in the Union pickets the three determined that a successful attack in “this quarter would be impossible.” The Confederate leaders unanimously decided to shift the focus of their attack back to Fort Sanders. The scheduled attack, using the previous plan, was again postponed on the 27th. On the 28th Longstreet announced that the plan was not only postponed again but drastically altered. Instead of a period of artillery preparation he insisted, probably at Leadbetter’s urging that a surprise attack by infantry only at dawn on the 29th would be the course of action.

Referring to a reconnaissance they had conducted on the 27th Longstreet wrote to BG Micah Jenkins on the 28th that “The work of the enemy is not inclosed (sic).The ditch is probably at some points not more than 3 feet deep and 5 or 6 feet wide…we so judged… in looking at a man walk down the parapet and over the ditch.” On this bit of information rested the fate of the attack. MG Lafayette McLaws was ordered to prepare his brigades for an assault. McLaws issued orders for Humphreys’ Brigade of Mississippi troops to form the right of the advance with Wofford’s Georgia Brigade on the left. Bryan’s Brigade would form the reserve. Jenkins would support the main effort with an attack on McLaws' left.

During the early morning hours of the 29th the Confederate picket line surged forward and pushed the Union pickets almost back into the fort. Sharpshooters were positioned to provide covering fire into the fort. The retreating Union pickets raised the alarm and the garrison quietly prepared for the assault they knew was inevitable. The defenders poured water out of their embrasures so that the frigid night air would form an icy crust on the steep parapet walls. The garrison was reinforced and confidently awaited the attack.

“As soon as it was light enough for them to see” the sharpshooters began to pour fire into the fort and the advance began. The two brigades moved forward through a light abatis and the wire tangle foot, which momentarily disrupted the move but served as no great obstacle. When they reached the fort they discovered that the reconnaissance reports were horribly wrong. They were faced with a ditch between 10-13 feet deep with near vertical sides.

To escape the fire coming from the fort and to make an effort at scaling the walls the Confederate attackers crowded into the ditch. Like the railroad cut at Gettysburg and the outside works at Franklin the sanctuary proved a death trap. Flanking fire devastated the trapped men. The troops manning the fort at the point of assault improvised ways to add to the destruction. One artilleryman, unable to depress his piece enough to fire into the pit, began lighting the fuses and hand tossed the rounds over the wall. Artillery capable of firing into the deadly mayhem did so with triple loads of canister. The few Confederates that managed to claw their way to the top of the parapet were equally devastated. One Union officer dispatched an intrepid attacker by placing “my pistol six inches from his face and pulling the trigger three times.” Nearby another defender was beating back an effort to enter the fort with an axe. 

Longstreet's headquarters during the assault

The assault was mercifully called back. The bloody twenty minute effort cost the Confederates 813 casualties while the defenders suffered approximately 20. The siege of Knoxville was not over but no further efforts were made at the Union line. On December 3rd the threat of a relief column from Chattanooga caused Longstreet to lift the siege. Informed by Bragg that he was on his own Longstreet did not attempt to unify his forces with Bragg. Instead he moved off in the opposite direction.

SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE

Knoxville seen from south bank of Tennessee River about 1864

The defenses at Knoxville had been prepared by Captain Orlando Poe and his engineer battalion comprised of detailed men from the infantry regiments. With orders to build works for 600 men he designed two forts to improve the incomplete Confederate works from an earlier occupation. Burnside quickly approved the designs but “the work progressed slowly on account of the difficulty of getting suitable materials.” The two Forts were therefore incomplete when occupied by the forces retreating from Campbell’s Station on the 17th. Poe was directed by Burnside “to put the troops into position as fast as they arrived.” Thoroughly familiar with the ground, Poe prepared a written order containing the position to be assumed by each regiment as it entered the city. The exhausted arrivals wasted no time in improving the line. Confederate forces occupied an opposing line after driving back the Federal cavalry acting as a rear guard. BG William P. Sanders, leading the Union troopers was killed in the final action before the standoff at Knoxville began. The improved work at the northwest corner of the Knoxville defense, formerly Fort Loudon, was named in his honor on the 18th. Each side made ready for the coming siege operations.

Longstreet understood he did not have time for a protracted siege and selected Fort Sanders as the site for his inevitable assault. He reasoned that his men could get to within 200 yards of the Unions works while still under cover and that would benefit the attacking force. To this end he placed thirty of his available artillery pieces into position to fire into the fort. The remaining four guns, howitzers, were rigged as improvised mortars by placing the axle on a skid until they reached “an elevation of about sixty degrees.” All the guns were protected by earth works. These preparations took until the 24th to complete.

Besides the usual skirmish activity the defenders also worked on improving their position, by “falling timber and spreading loose brush…along the front of the line” forming an abatis. Most troublesome were a number of buildings outside the line of works that could provide a platform for observation and shelter for Confederate sharpshooters. On the nights of the 18th and 19th details were sent out to burn the buildings to deny their use to the enemy and clear fields of fire. On the 20th MG Ferrero ordered the 17th Michigan to push the Confederates out of a building about 1000 yards from the fort “doing material damage to my line of skirmishers.” Companies A and F moved forward followed by a five man “burning party”. The troops cleared the building and succeeded in applying the torch. On their move back to the Union line they were opened on by Confederate artillery, killing two and wounding four others. Longstreet became convinced that some advantage could be gained by seizing the heights south of the river that covered Fort Sanders. On the 21st he sent two brigades (Law and Robertson) across the river in boats to attack the hills. A short but bitter struggle managed to gain control of one the hills only to discover that the range was too great for his artillery. Longstreet decided not to waste his limited supply of ammunition and the valiant efforts of Robertson’s Texans and Law’s Alabama Brigade went for naught.

Two days of relative peace, caused mostly by heavy rains, were followed by an unusual effort on the 23rd. MG Ferrero reported that during the night two miles of telegraph wire were stretched “in front of my line forming entanglements.” The next day the 2nd Michigan was detailed to drive enemy pickets from positions 200 yards from Fort Sanders. The rifle pits were cleared of Confederates but could not be held. After two hours they were forced to retreat after suffering nearly 50% casualties. The affair cost the Wolverine regiment 2 killed, 60 wounded and 24 missing or captured. Thereafter things remained quiet until the 28th when a general advance by the Confederates that drove the Union pickets “nearly to the works” foretold of coming events.

Battle of Campbell's Station

CAMPBELL'S INN WAS STANDING DURING THE BATTLE AT CAMPBELL'S STATION

FULL VIEW 

 

 As Wheeler’s cavalry were trying Knoxville’s “back door” around Maryville, Longstreet moved to strike Burnside head-on. On the night of the 13 November the Confederates executed a nearly flawless river crossing under the most difficult of circumstances. After dark the boats were manhandled to the water and the bridge thrown with a minimum of resistance. Fleeing Federal pickets spread the alarm. It was no matter for Burnside had no intention of contesting his bridgehead. His primary goal was to delay Longstreet long enough to evacuate his advanced forces into the city.

  BG Edward Ferrero’s division had been detailed to watch for the Confederate crossing in the vicinity of Loudon. Unbeknownst to Longstreet his maneuver was neither unexpected nor undetected. Ferraro’s men rushed to Huff’s Ferry, arriving about 2200. While keeping an eye on Longstreet’s movement and skirmishing with his pickets Ferraro was called back to Burnside’s headquarters. He was instructed to fall back slowly “so as to draw the enemy over the river and keep him engaged while other important movements were being carried out by the army in Middle Tennessee.”

  In a driving rain Ferrero began the slow retreat. Both sides struggled on the muddy roads. Ferrero attached regiments of troops to each piece of artillery to help move them after the teams started giving out. Slowly they made their way back to Lenoir’s Station. Here they fought off “several attacks on my picket line,”

  The following morning they began a movement back to Campbell’s Station. Longstreet now saw the Union strategy and was determined to make quick work of the retreating forces before they could reach the city. He wanted no part of time consuming siege operations if they could be avoided. His plan involved forced marches northeast on the Kingston Road to cut Burnside’s escape route. Both men realized the race to Campbell’s Station was on. The winner would have a decided advantage. The hard marching Confederates gained a slight lead but Burnside countered with one of his best decisions of the war. He ordered all nonessential equipment abandoned. Wagons and extra caissons were left mired and three regiments were veered away to delay Micah Jenkins’ (Hood’s) division. At the same time a group of “500 or 600 mounted men “ and a battery were rushed forward to take control of the critical junction of the Concord and Kingston Roads. They arrived fifteen minutes ahead of the lead elements of Longstreet.

  As the Union retreat continued the Federal rear guard continued to delay. They “skirmished with us for every hill and wood and stream on the road.” The resulting delay allowed the main body to establish a line on the Kingston Road. Longstreet quickly developed a plan for not only cutting them off from their Knoxville works but crushing them in place. MG Lafayette McLaws formed in the front of the Union position and held their attention while BG Evander Law’s brigade was sent on a flanking march around the Federal left. This movement was detected by Burnside from a nearby hill and he ordered an adjustment to the Federal line. While this move was being accomplished McLaws men struck at the Union right and again on the right center. Both attacks were repulsed with heavy loss. Law never managed to get his men into the proper position and ended up scrambling the Confederate lines and disrupting the timing of the attack. Furthermore his men did not get deep enough to cut the road behind the Union forces. They were beaten back as was McLaws attempt at flanking the right of the Union line. Before any more efforts could be made darkness called an end to hostilities. During the night Burnside’s infantry retreated to Knoxville and 700 cavalry troopers delayed the Confederate advance until the evening of the 17th. Knoxville was gained and the shape of the campaign changed. Casualties totaled 570 for the Confederates and 320 for Burnside’s defenders. Law’s brigade suffered but 1 killed and 12 wounded in their weak effort.

Battle of Blue Springs October 10, 1863

 

Full View

Blue Springs ~ Oct. 10, 1863

 The Union campaigns for Chattanooga and Knoxville were intended to be mutually supportive. Burnside’s efforts were planned to threaten Bragg’s right and rear thereby creating a diffusion of Confederate strength. In an effort to affect the unification of Union forces Burnside has pushed cavalry forward as far as Cleveland. The Confederate victory at Chickamauga dashed any hopes of a quick unification and following the battle Burnside was forced to retract his dangerously exposed forward elements to the vicinity of Loudon.

  Before Longstreet’s expedition against Knoxville got underway Burnside was busy expanding his position in the far eastern portion of Tennessee. Not content to simply wait out developments he sent BG Samuel Carter’s cavalry to secure the avenues of approach from Virginia and, if possible seize the important salt works at Abington. By coincidence the remaining Confederate division in the area, under MG Robert Ransom, was moving to interdict the Union supply line at Cumberland Gap. Ransom sent BG John S. Williams ahead with his troopers “to cover a movement…upon Cumberland Gap”. The opposing riders made initial contact in a meeting engagement on 3 October at Blue Springs, Tennessee. Both sides recoiled from the initial contact and spent the better part of the next week sparring with skirmishers and awaiting reinforcements.

  Unfortunately for Williams his aggressiveness had moved his force too far ahead of and without adequate support. MG Ransom had not planned on advancing beyond Greenville and sent an order for Williams to assume command of all troops lest communication be severed between them. Williams mistakenly believed that the advance on Cumberland Gap would continue while he occupied the Federal troops at Blue Springs. Carter had no such trouble understanding his role. Burnside was personally leading a cavalry division and troops from Ferraro’s infantry division to his assistance. Attempting to match the extension of the ever growing Union line Williams extended his force into a position that covered over two miles. The Confederate defense was stretched until it comprised “nothing but a line of skirmishers.” On October 10th, after a reconnaissance by Chief Engineer, Captain Orlando Poe, the Union attack was launched at the Confederate center while cavalry, under Colonel Foster, attempted to gain their rear by sweeping around the right flank of Williams’ position. The Union attack pushed to the very rear of the Confederate line before being repelled by a barrage from a judiciously placed battery. Foster’s column did not make it into position in time to render assistance or cut off the line of retreat. The Union forces fled under the deluge of canister. Darkness and the absence of Foster’s men allowed Williams to conduct a retreat.

  After the battle Williams discovered the expedition to Cumberland Gap had been cancelled and his fight had been unnecessary. All that remained to be done was to march out of Tennessee to safety. After uniting with a small force under BG Alfred E. Jackson at Greenville they began their escape. In the darkness the artillery took a wrong turn and while the main column waited for them to catch up the Federal troopers caught them at Rheatown and again on the 13th at Blountsville. These small actions delayed but did not stop the retreat into Virginia. Losses for the unnecessary fight totaled 216 Confederates and 100 Federals. As a postscript to the affair Williams requested and was granted relief from command.

Skirmish at Blain's Cross Roads

BLAIN'S CROSS-ROADS, December 17, 1863.

 

This morning the enemy advanced in small force on Gen. Sturgis' pickets, but nothing serious since then; but few shots have been fired, and those at longrange.

~ ~ ~

JNO. G. PARKE, Maj.-Gen.

~ ~ ~

BLAIN'S CROSS-ROADS, December 17, 1863—4 p. m.

 

The enemy has not made any serious demonstration onthe Rutledge road up to this time; since noon they have been pressing the brigade. Spears stationed at Stone's Mill, Richland Church, about 2 miles on our right, where the river road crosses Richland Creek. They may be massing on the river road, but Gen. Granger thinks it would be risky for them to attempt this move. Still, if this be so, we may be forced to fall back on the line of Flat Creek. Gen. Sturgis will send a division of cavalry to occupy the line of Richland Creek. I regret that Elliott has been able to cross but one brigade. He is now at Strawberry Plains, and will get over as soon as he can. I am glad to hear you are coming up.

 

JNO. G. PARKE, Maj.-Gen.

 

BLAIN'S CROSS-ROADS, December 17, 1863—11.30 p. m. 

 

Yours of 8.25 just received. By the river road, I mean a road parallel to the Rutledge road, and the north side of Holston—one of the many roads not indicated on our map. The point where this road

crosses Richland Creek (Stone's Mill) is still held by Spears' brigade. I have reason to believe that there was no infantry appeared against him this evening. The last report from there was all quiet. In fact, the enemy's advance had retired and were followed by our skirmishers. How far they pursued I cannot say. No report yet made. I presume not far. My impression about Longstreet massing on the river road was not confirmed by the observations from our signal mountain. No large camp fires were visible, nor large smokes seen in our front on either road a sundown. In fact, I am now inclined to believe that there is nothing but cavalry in our immediate front. Shall I send an ambulance to Strawberry Plains for you? There is a very good one here that Col. Babcock, of the Ninth Corps, has suggested to send.

 

JNO. G. PARKE, Maj.-Gen.