Confederate Brig. Gen. Alfred Eugene Jackson

“Who?” you ask. “Sure, I know ‘Stonewall,’ but who in hell is ‘Mudwall’ Jackson?”

 

On December 1, 1863, the 1st Tennessee Caverlry was serving under 

Gen. Alfred Eugene Jackson.

Don’t feel bad if you can’t place him, for his identity has been confused for over 125 years. Even Jeff Davis wasn’t sure which of the several Jacksons he was, and “Mudwall” has been misidentified in some prominent modern works. So read on as we solve this little mystery of the real “Mudwall”. . . For the record, the one and only “Mudwall” was Confederate Brig. Gen. Alfred Eugene Jackson of Jonesborough in East Tennessee. A prominent businessman, farmer, and slave holder, Jackson had amassed a large fortune by 1861. He cast his lot with the South and joined Brig. Gen. Felix K. Zollicoffer’s staff as brigade quartermaster, later serving as paymaster at Knoxville. Probably as a result of political motivation to advance the ever-shaky Confederate cause in East Tennessee, an area of ardent Union sympathies, Jackson was promoted to command a brigade in February 1863. Jackson’s military service was, to put it mildly, mediocre. His “brigade” (rarely numbering over 800) was a hodgepodge of home guards, irregulars, and Thomas’ Cherokee Legion, occasionally reinforced with veteran units such as the 4th Kentucky Cavalry. Jackson’s own troops were reported to be poorly disciplined, in-efficient, and “utterly unreliable.”

That Jackson himself was not much of a leader is demonstrated by the reports of those who served under him. He put his officers on trial for imaginary infractions and constantly reprimanded them in front of privates. The officers of Thomas’ Legion became so irate that they petitioned President Davis to have Jackson removed, citing his “irritable temper intensified by diseased nerves and aggravated by being in a position for which the man is morally and physically unfit.”

Jackson’s command spent most of its time in the ridges and valleys northeast of Knoxville, guarding the vital East Tennessee and Virginia rail link. Here Jackson won his only victory of note, capturing a 300 man detachment of the 100th Ohio Infantry at Limestone on September 8, 1863. Following the loss of Knoxville in December 1863, and the Confederate withdrawal from East Tennessee the following spring, Jackson took command of the forces guarding the important salt works at Saltville in Southwest Virginia. At Saltville Jackson’s command consisted of only a few hundred ineffective irregulars, and he was relieved and ordered to the Army of Tennessee, then fighting for Atlanta; however, there is  no evidence that Jackson ever assumed command of the brigade that awaited him, and September 1864 found him again in command at Saltville. This posting was short-lived, as Jackson was found unfit for active field duty in November and was ordered to light duty on Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge’s staff. Here “Mudwall’s” war record ends. After the war he returned to Jonesborough and largely rebuilt his fortunes, dying at his home in 1889 at age 83. 

The origin of Alfred E. Jackson’s nickname is not entirely clear. Some have stated it was to contrast him with the more famous Thomas J. Jackson (no relation), and it seems clear that “Stonewall” inspired the form of the Tennessean’s cognomen. While it is probable that his personality had already earned him the derisive sobriquet, the action at Limestone in September 1863 brought the nick name into widespread use. Although outnumbering the Ohio troops by some four to one, Jackson was extremely cautious in approaching them. While he hesitated, his veteran troops chomped at the bit to attack. Finally, unable to stand the delay any longer, Capt. Bart Jenkins rushed up to “Mudwall” and suggested that while the artillery pinned the enemy down in front, the 4th Kentucky Cavalry should ride around their flank and attack them from the rear. In the words of one of Capt. Jenkins’ comrades, Jackson’s “slow, inferior, vacillating mind” finally saw the wisdom of this course. 

The Kentuckians beat the handful of Buckeyes in a sharp fight, and finding themselves surrounded, the 300 men of the 100th Ohio surrendered. Jackson, however, decided better of holding onto his gains, and he timidly ordered his command to fall back some 20 miles and await support from Confederates in Southwest Virginia. The story of Jackson’s role in the battle at Limestone spread throughout the district and the nickname “Mudwall” was his for posterity—if only the history books would get the facts straight. 

Although infamous to the men who served under him, Jackson was not well-known outside the East Tennessee area. Indeed, Jefferson Davis was somewhat confused over his identity, as shown in a report written by Col. William Preston Johnston in September 1863. Citing Jackson’s nervousness when under pressure, Col. Johnston went into some detail to describe Jackson to Davis, because the President “was not fully satisfied what General Jackson it was.” 

To confuse the issue even further, E. Porter Alexander, James Longstreet’s chief of artillery, heard a slightly different version of t he nickname when Longstreet’s corps spent the spring of 1864 in East Tennessee. Noting that Jackson had been called “Mudwall” early in the war, Alexander stated that Jackson had been “promoted” to “Brickwall” Jackson for success in battle. Alexander undoubtedly heard the tale from locals, who were well aware of Jackson’s war record, so his comment was probably facetious.

The confusion did not die with the end of the war; instead, it has gotten worse. The first recorded instance is in an article in Southern Historical Society Papers in 1906, in which the nickname “Mudwall” is mistakenly applied to Brig. Gen. William Lowther Jackson, a cousin of “Stonewall” Jackson. This case of mistaken identity was continued in a series of letters appearing in Confederate Veteran in late 1909, with the record being set straight in this instance by one of N. B. Forrest’s cavalrymen. 

The modern mix-up apparently started with a revision of Ezra Warner’s Generals in Gray. The first printing of the first edition (1959) correctly lists Alfred Eugene Jackson as “Mudwall.” The second printing of this same edition, however, switches the sobriquet to William Lowther Jackson. The entry in this edition for Alfred makes no mention of “Mudwall.”

This confusion has continued in other modern studies. Even well-known author and historian James Lee McDonough has fallen prey, hanging the nickname “Mudwall” on yet another Jackson— Brig. Gen. John K. Jackson—in McDonough’s Chattanooga — A Death Grip on the Confederacy. Two recent massive compilations have continued the mix-up, apparently based on the mistake in Warner’s work. Both the Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (1986) and Stewart Sifakis’ Who Was Who in the Civil War (1988) identify William L. Jackson as “Mudwall”; the Historical Times Encyclopedia even goes so far as to say that Alfred Jackson “is sometimes confused with William ‘Mudwall’ Jackson.” In editing E. Porter Alexander’s Fighting for the Confederacy, able historian Gary Gallagher discovered the confusion and in a footnote correctly surmised that “Mudwall” must be Alfred E. Jackson, although he seems reluctant to state this conclusively.

If for no other reason, respect for the memory of the other Jacksons should demand the record be set straight. As for Alfred E. Jackson, his nickname “Mudwall” was apparently well deserved. The publishers of the aforementioned works should take note of this article and correct the confusion in future editions. If they don’t, at least all of us can now pick the real “Mudwall” out of the Jackson line-up. . . .

ASSAULT ON FORT SANDERS

"Fort Sanders"

The original plan for the assault on the Federal position at Fort Sanders called for the improvised mortars to open at sunrise on the 25th followed by the direct fire guns. Sharpshooters were to seize the advanced Union rifle pits and keep up a deadly fire on the embrasures to mask the approach of the main attack force. While all these preparations were in the works Longstreet learned that Bragg had succumbed to his appeal for reinforcements. Bragg had decided to reinforce him with two divisions from around Chattanooga. The bulk of the planned movement was recalled when the fight for Missionary Ridge exploded in the midst of the deployment. Longstreet decided to postpone the attack awaiting the promised reinforcements. Johnson’s and Gracie’s brigades began to arrive at Knoxville late on the 2Accompanying these troops was BG Leadbetter, Bragg’s Chief Engineer. On Friday November 26th Leadbetter, Longstreet, and E. P. Alexander conducted a reconnaissance of the area north of Knoxville in hopes of finding an area better suited or the assault. After Wheeler’s cavalry drove in the Union pickets the three determined that a successful attack in “this quarter would be impossible.” The Confederate leaders unanimously decided to shift the focus of their attack back to Fort Sanders. The scheduled attack, using the previous plan, was again postponed on the 27th. On the 28th Longstreet announced that the plan was not only postponed again but drastically altered. Instead of a period of artillery preparation he insisted, probably at Leadbetter’s urging that a surprise attack by infantry only at dawn on the 29th would be the course of action.

Referring to a reconnaissance they had conducted on the 27th Longstreet wrote to BG Micah Jenkins on the 28th that “The work of the enemy is not inclosed (sic).The ditch is probably at some points not more than 3 feet deep and 5 or 6 feet wide…we so judged… in looking at a man walk down the parapet and over the ditch.” On this bit of information rested the fate of the attack. MG Lafayette McLaws was ordered to prepare his brigades for an assault. McLaws issued orders for Humphreys’ Brigade of Mississippi troops to form the right of the advance with Wofford’s Georgia Brigade on the left. Bryan’s Brigade would form the reserve. Jenkins would support the main effort with an attack on McLaws' left.

During the early morning hours of the 29th the Confederate picket line surged forward and pushed the Union pickets almost back into the fort. Sharpshooters were positioned to provide covering fire into the fort. The retreating Union pickets raised the alarm and the garrison quietly prepared for the assault they knew was inevitable. The defenders poured water out of their embrasures so that the frigid night air would form an icy crust on the steep parapet walls. The garrison was reinforced and confidently awaited the attack.

“As soon as it was light enough for them to see” the sharpshooters began to pour fire into the fort and the advance began. The two brigades moved forward through a light abatis and the wire tangle foot, which momentarily disrupted the move but served as no great obstacle. When they reached the fort they discovered that the reconnaissance reports were horribly wrong. They were faced with a ditch between 10-13 feet deep with near vertical sides.

To escape the fire coming from the fort and to make an effort at scaling the walls the Confederate attackers crowded into the ditch. Like the railroad cut at Gettysburg and the outside works at Franklin the sanctuary proved a death trap. Flanking fire devastated the trapped men. The troops manning the fort at the point of assault improvised ways to add to the destruction. One artilleryman, unable to depress his piece enough to fire into the pit, began lighting the fuses and hand tossed the rounds over the wall. Artillery capable of firing into the deadly mayhem did so with triple loads of canister. The few Confederates that managed to claw their way to the top of the parapet were equally devastated. One Union officer dispatched an intrepid attacker by placing “my pistol six inches from his face and pulling the trigger three times.” Nearby another defender was beating back an effort to enter the fort with an axe. 

Longstreet's headquarters during the assault

The assault was mercifully called back. The bloody twenty minute effort cost the Confederates 813 casualties while the defenders suffered approximately 20. The siege of Knoxville was not over but no further efforts were made at the Union line. On December 3rd the threat of a relief column from Chattanooga caused Longstreet to lift the siege. Informed by Bragg that he was on his own Longstreet did not attempt to unify his forces with Bragg. Instead he moved off in the opposite direction.

SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE

Knoxville seen from south bank of Tennessee River about 1864

The defenses at Knoxville had been prepared by Captain Orlando Poe and his engineer battalion comprised of detailed men from the infantry regiments. With orders to build works for 600 men he designed two forts to improve the incomplete Confederate works from an earlier occupation. Burnside quickly approved the designs but “the work progressed slowly on account of the difficulty of getting suitable materials.” The two Forts were therefore incomplete when occupied by the forces retreating from Campbell’s Station on the 17th. Poe was directed by Burnside “to put the troops into position as fast as they arrived.” Thoroughly familiar with the ground, Poe prepared a written order containing the position to be assumed by each regiment as it entered the city. The exhausted arrivals wasted no time in improving the line. Confederate forces occupied an opposing line after driving back the Federal cavalry acting as a rear guard. BG William P. Sanders, leading the Union troopers was killed in the final action before the standoff at Knoxville began. The improved work at the northwest corner of the Knoxville defense, formerly Fort Loudon, was named in his honor on the 18th. Each side made ready for the coming siege operations.

Longstreet understood he did not have time for a protracted siege and selected Fort Sanders as the site for his inevitable assault. He reasoned that his men could get to within 200 yards of the Unions works while still under cover and that would benefit the attacking force. To this end he placed thirty of his available artillery pieces into position to fire into the fort. The remaining four guns, howitzers, were rigged as improvised mortars by placing the axle on a skid until they reached “an elevation of about sixty degrees.” All the guns were protected by earth works. These preparations took until the 24th to complete.

Besides the usual skirmish activity the defenders also worked on improving their position, by “falling timber and spreading loose brush…along the front of the line” forming an abatis. Most troublesome were a number of buildings outside the line of works that could provide a platform for observation and shelter for Confederate sharpshooters. On the nights of the 18th and 19th details were sent out to burn the buildings to deny their use to the enemy and clear fields of fire. On the 20th MG Ferrero ordered the 17th Michigan to push the Confederates out of a building about 1000 yards from the fort “doing material damage to my line of skirmishers.” Companies A and F moved forward followed by a five man “burning party”. The troops cleared the building and succeeded in applying the torch. On their move back to the Union line they were opened on by Confederate artillery, killing two and wounding four others. Longstreet became convinced that some advantage could be gained by seizing the heights south of the river that covered Fort Sanders. On the 21st he sent two brigades (Law and Robertson) across the river in boats to attack the hills. A short but bitter struggle managed to gain control of one the hills only to discover that the range was too great for his artillery. Longstreet decided not to waste his limited supply of ammunition and the valiant efforts of Robertson’s Texans and Law’s Alabama Brigade went for naught.

Two days of relative peace, caused mostly by heavy rains, were followed by an unusual effort on the 23rd. MG Ferrero reported that during the night two miles of telegraph wire were stretched “in front of my line forming entanglements.” The next day the 2nd Michigan was detailed to drive enemy pickets from positions 200 yards from Fort Sanders. The rifle pits were cleared of Confederates but could not be held. After two hours they were forced to retreat after suffering nearly 50% casualties. The affair cost the Wolverine regiment 2 killed, 60 wounded and 24 missing or captured. Thereafter things remained quiet until the 28th when a general advance by the Confederates that drove the Union pickets “nearly to the works” foretold of coming events.