The Battle of Dutton’s Hill

On March 30, General Pegram chose a defensive position on Dutton’s Hill near the intersection of the Crab Orchard & Stanford roads, in an effort to protect his cattle, which were then crossing the Cumberland River a mere six-miles away. Pegram placed Colonel Scott of the 1^st Louisiana in charge of the mounted troops. The 16^th Tennessee Battalion was deployed on the Stanford Road. The 1^st Louisiana and the 1^st Tennessee were placed at the intersection. Dismounting the balance of his men, except for the three companies from the 1^st Florida which were crossing the cattle, to the position on Dutton’s Hill.

The 1^st Georgia was placed on the right. Steele’s Battalion held the center, and the 2^nd Tennessee was placed upon the left. Huwald’s Battery was placed in advantageous positions.

General Gillmore began his attack at 12:30 p. m., with an artillery barrage, which was damaging to the Confederate defenses. Meanwhile he placed the 1^st Kentucky dismounted in the woods to the right. The 7^th Ohio and the four Rodman guns were placed in the center. Dismounting, the 44^th & 45^th Ohio took a position on the left. Believing his mountain howitzers to be useless, Gillmore, placed them in reserve.

General Pegram’s and Colonel Scott’s after action reports differ as to how events unfolded during the three-hour battle to hold the hill. Colonel Scott took the 1^st Louisiana and 1^st Tennessee and attempted to flank the position of the 1^st Kentucky Cavalry, so that they could get to the rear of the Union artillery. Pegram claims he held out for an hour awaiting Scott’s attack, which he felt should have taken only 10 minutes to have begun. Colonel Scott stated that an aide to General Pegram, Lt. J. F. Ranson, had countermanded the order and had halted the bulk of his command without his knowledge. As a result Scott charged the Union position with 30 troopers managing to capture just three horses. Furious, Scott retired and confronted Lt. Ranson, chastising him for delivering the order to halt to Lt. Colonel Nixon instead of himself, and cursing General Pegram in the process. In the meantime General Pegram reversed himself and ordered the flanking attack once again.

Observing the Confederate maneuvering, General Gillmore took steps to prevent its success. As Colonel Scott withdrew his troopers for a second attempt, Gillmore ordered the 44^th and 45^th Ohio Infantry and the 7^th Ohio Cavalry to storm the hill, which they captured after a desperate defense of a thicket by three companies of the 2^nd Tennessee. Captain Footman of the 1^st Florida Cavalry had sent a detachment to support Pegram but they arrived too late to be of assistance. Gillmore quickly sent the 7^th Ohio to support the 1^st Kentucky by flanking Scott’s position, while parts of the 44^th and 45^th Ohio Infantry marched to the support as well.

After regrouping his command of approximately 330 men, Colonel Scott split them into three groups. Lt. Colonel Nixon with 6 companies and Captain Mathews with 4 companies of the 1^st Louisiana charged the union troops at a right angle upon the Crab Orchard road. Captain Mathews of company A, and the members of his company, were known to wear rattlesnake tails on their hats. Meanwhile Colonel Carter’s 1^st Tennessee cavalry proceeded a few hundred yards and then charged pell-mell down the Crab Orchard road. Due to the terrain the 1^st Louisiana was forced to fight dismounted. With the element of surprise gone the attack failed. For the first time in its history the 1^st Louisiana was forced to give up ground it held.

During the next two hours the 1^st Louisiana and 1^st Tennessee retired fighting from various positions in an effort to delay the Union advance while Pegram took a new position on Sugar Hill approximately 2 and 1/2 miles south of Somerset. During the combat the 1^st Tennessee lost its colors which had recently been presented to them by the daughter of General Marshall. The 1^st Louisiana reported losses of 75 men. The 1^st Tennessee reported losses of 37 men. After some half-hearted skirmishing, about 5:30 p.m., Pegram was allowed to withdraw under the cover of night. The Confederates crossed the Cumberland River at Stigall’s and Newell’s ferries with 537 of the 750 cattle that they had collected. General Pegram additionally claimed to have captured and paroled 178 Union soldiers. His losses were approximately 200 killed, wounded or missing. The Confederate prisoners were sent to Forts McHenry and Monroe. From there they were forwarded to City Point, Virginia, for exchange.

After the Battle of Dutton’s Hill, General Pegram ordered the arrest of Colonel Scott, court-martialing him for cursing a superior officer. Although found guilty, Colonel Scott received a light reprimand from General S. B. Buckner before being returned to command a brigade of cavalry.

Lt. Colonel Nixon filed six charges against General Pegram, which seem to have never been adjudicated by Confederate authorities.

The 14th (Carter's) Tennessee Cavalry Battalion

The 14th (Carter's) Tennessee Cavalry Battalion

On May 12, 1862, the battalion was reorganized with James E. Carter as Lieutenant Colonel, and Onslow Bean as Major, and was officially recognized as the 14th (Carter's) Tennessee Cavalry Battalion. On November 14, 1862, the battalion was increased to a regiment by the addition of four other companies; two other companies were added in 1863. The company letters were changed at the reorganization as the 14th Battalion, and again at the organization of the regiment. Prior to the organization of the regiment, the battalion had been operating in the neighborhood of Cumberland and Big Creek Gaps, along the line of railroad. When the regiment was organized it was assigned to Brigadier General John Pegram's Cavalry Brigade in Lieutenant General E. Kirby Smith's Department. This brigade was composed of Howard's Alabama Regiment, 2nd (Ashby's), 4th (Starnes'), J. E. Carter's Tennessee Cavalry Regiment, and Marshall's Battery.

My GGGrandfather enlisted in September of 1862. Therefor, from September till November, he rode for the 14th (Carter's) Cavalry Battalion. I'm wondering if, while being assigned to General Pegram, if he rode with General Morgan during this period. Sometimes, the 14th Brigade is referred to as just that, and "Carter's" is excluded.

Colonel John S. Scott reports his engagement on Crab Orchards Road, during the Expedition into Kentucky

 

Colonel John Simms Scott 1865

Report of Col. J.S. Scott, First Louisiana Cavalry.

APRIL 4, 1863.

SIR: In accordance with orders, on March 30, while you were engaged with the enemy on the Crab Orchard road, I moved from your left with my own and Colonel (James E.) Carter’s regiment, to attack the enemy in flank and rear. After advancing about 1,000 yards, and reaching the head of a ravine that opened on the Crab Orchard road immediately in rear of the enemy’s batteries, I came in contact with a regiment moving in column, dismounted, bearing guns with fixed bayonets. I ordered my men to front into line for a charge, but soon discovered that I had but 30 men with me. On inquiry as to what had become of my command, I was informed by Captain (G.A.) Scott, who had pushed up from the rear, that it had been cut off by Lieutenant (J.F.) Ransom, one of your aides, ordered to countermarch, and resume the position which I had left. The enemy, whom I met at the head of the ravine, fled without firing a gun, and with my 30 men I marched back in the direction of where my command had been ordered by your aide. Before reaching them, however, I learned that you had ordered them back to me, and renewed the order to charge the enemy’s rear. After my command had returned, I found that my movements were discovered by the enemy, and he had made such preparation as rendered it impossible to attack him as near his front as first intended. After moving a few hundred yards farther to the rear, I divided my command into three parts, placing six companies of the First Louisiana Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel (James O.) Nixon, and four under Captain (Samuel) Matthews, with orders to charge down at right angles to the Crab Orchard road, while Colonel Carter, by making a detour to the left, would strike the same road several hundred yards farther to the rear, and charge up it. Owing to the unevenness of the ground, the two detachments of the First Louisiana were unable to reach the road, mounted, and finding the enemy in force on their front, a part of the regiment was dismounted, which engaged him briskly, while Colonel Carter gallantry drove through a regiment of infantry and dispersed a detachment of cavalry. But finding the enemy in front of Colonel Nixon too strong, he filed to the right and formed in rear of the First Louisiana, who at that time were engaging the enemy with spirit and determination. Lieutenant-Colonel Nixon fought them until his ammunition was exhausted, when he retired to the rear of Colonel Carter, who gave them a heavy volley as the cavalry charged; but, being overpowered by numbers, was compelled to give way. On the Stanford road I again rallied my men, and with a few rounds of ammunition checked and drove back the enemy with some loss, and retired toward the Cumberland.

  After the charge of Colonel Carter, a fight could have been avoided, and the two regiments been brought off without the loss of 10 men; but both officers and men seemed to feel that upon an effort made there devolved the safety of the brigade, and all were willing to submit to any sacrifice to insure its safe crossing at the river. It was for this reason that I attempted to make a stand against a force fully five times my number, and that had already flanked me on both wings.

My command did not number over 330 men. Of that number the First Louisiana lost 71 men and 4 commissioned officers, and Colonel Carter’s lost 5 commissioned officers and 32 men.

  The individual acts of gallantry and heroism were so numerous as to preclude the possibility of my detailing them. Colonel Carter and Lieutenant-Colonel Nixon displayed great coolness on the field. The former was at one time completely surrounded, and made his escape by use of his pistol. The latter had his bridle-reins seized by a Yankee officer, but succeeded in making his escape with a slight wound in his hand.

  This is the first time that the First Louisiana Cavalry has ever turned their backs on an enemy, and I assure you I feel as much mortified as any soldier could who thinks he has done his duty. But for the unfortunate circumstance of cutting my command in two when I thought I had an advantage of the enemy, the disasters of the day might have been very much lessened, and I would respectfully suggest that aides in the future be instructed to bear your messages to me in person, instead of halting my column in a charge and in the face of a powerful enemy.

Very respectfully,

J.S. SCOTT,

Colonel First Louisiana Cavalry.

Brigadier-General PEGRAM,

Commanding Cavalry.

Pegram’s Expedition into Kentucky, March 22-April 1, 1863

Report of Brig. Gen. John Pegram, C.S. Army, commanding expedition.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY BRIGADE,

Near Stigall’s Ferry, Ky., April 1, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the expedition of my brigade into this State for the purpose of obtaining beef-cattle for the Confederate Army:

On Sunday, the 22d ultimo, I commenced crossing my command at this ferry, and early on Monday morning had the whole force, numbering about 1,550 cavalry and (G.A.) Huwald’s battery of three pieces, on the north bank of the river. I immediately commenced a forced march over a very muddy road, and, moving nearly the whole night, reached and attacked Danville about 2 o’clock on the next day. The enemy, though numbering five regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and seven pieces of artillery, after a slight resistance, retired from before the town, and commenced retreating by the road toward Camp Dick Robinson. We attacked their rear by charging them in the streets of Danville. The First Louisiana (Lieutenant-Colonel (James O.) Nixon commanding) led the column. On entering the suburbs of the town, it was met by a heavy fire from an infantry ambuscade in a thicket not more than 50 yards distant. The regiment stood this fire for several minutes with the most admirable compoisure, and then, the infantry retiring, charged on into the town, followed by two companies of the Second Tennessee, led by their gallant colonel ((H.M.) Ashby), and by the First Georgia (Colonel (J.J.) Morrison). The street fight was brisk for some twenty minutes; rendered more so from the fact that some of the citizens fired at us from the windows. Just as the enemy left the town, I was handed an intercepted dispatch from Colonel (Benjamin P.) Runkle (Federal) to General (S.P.) Carter (Federal), saying he would arrive in Lancaster that night, and would try to join him on the main Lexington road running by Camp Dick Robinson. Ordering Colonel Nixon to follow up the rear of the enemy closely, I at once sent to recall the remainder of the command, and started for one of the fords over Dick’s River, with the view of throwing my command between Carter and Runkle near Camp Dick Robinson, but 61 miles and a sharp fight in twenty-eight hours had already proven too much for the horses, and I found it impossible to reach the desired point in time. Besides a few stores, we captured in Danville about 60 prisoners, among them being Lieutenant-Colonel (Silas) Adams, of (Frank) Wolford’s cavalry.

Learning from the citizens that the enemy regarded my force as the advance of a heavy infantry column, and having in view the clearing the three counties – Lincoln, Boyle, and Garrard – for some days, I pushed my command, with the exception of the First Louisiana Regiment (left at Danville to watch the Lebanon and Frankfort roads), up to within 2 miles of the Gibralter, at the Kentucky River bridge, whcih was occupied by the enemy with a force composed of the three arms, and greatly superior to my own in numbers. I played this game of bluff, occasionally skirmishing with the enemy, until the cattle had been collected, and then, burning the two bridges over Dick’s River (now much swollen by recent rains), I commenced falling back slowly by the Stanford and Somerset road.

On the morning of the 29th, I received a dispatch from Colonel Ashby, who had been sent by way of Crab Orchard, that the enemy was pressing him in heavy force. I immediately hurried the command on to Somerset, within 2 miles of which, on the morning of the 30th, I selected a strong position to resist the enemy. This step was imperative, both because the cattle were scarcely half crossed over the Cumberland River, and because, that the river being only 6 miles in my rear, the safety of my command somewhat depended upon giving the enemy a good check.

Leaving the Sixteenth Tennessee Battalion to watch the road toward Stanford, I placed the First Louisiana and First Tennessee Regiments, under Colonel (J.S.) Scott, at the junction of the Stanford and Crab Orchard roads. I then placed the First Georgia (dismounted) on the right of the selected position, Major (Theophilus) Steele’s battalion (of General John H. Morgan’s command) in the center, and the Second Tennessee on the left. (G.A.) Huwald’s pieces were placed on commanding points. The action commenced by an artillery fight, in which, though ours had 40 feet command over that of the enemy, theirs got the best of it. This was due both of the inferiority of our ammunition and to the want to practice of our cannoneers, most of whom were for the first time under fire; yet all of my men stood the heavy fire of artillery and small-arms with unflinching courage. Seeing very soon that the enemy was turning all of his force against that position, I ordered up Colonel Scott with his command. On arriving upon the field, he suggested I should allow him to move around the enemy’s right flank and to charge his rear. I told him to do so, but to act promptly, as everythbing depended upon his quickness. After he left, I held the position for more than an hour. His movements should have occupied ten minutes, and yet he never obeyed the orders given him. The enemy, forming his two infantry regiments in line of battle (his infantry was mounted, and of course dismounted for this formation), charged up the hill under cover of some undergrowth. My men stood until the enemy were within 30 yards, and then gave way from right to left. All efforts of myself and of the gallant officers assisting me failed to rally the men at that point.

Our loss was small in killed and wounded, but rather heavy in prisoners, owing to my being obliged to detach parts of three companies of the Second Tennessee to occupy a thicket to the left, which a regiment of the enemy was trying to get possession of.

All officers who came under my notice behaved with great gallantry, most conspicuous of whom were Colonels (J.J.) Morrison and (H.M.) Ashby, Lieutenant-Colonel (A.R.) Harper, and Captain (W.M.) Footman. The last-mentioned brave man was commanding a detachment of the First Florida Cavalry, which came up just in time to make the most gallant efforts to resist the advance of the enemy, and which lost very heavily. Captain Footman had his horse killed under him. He has, during this expedition, rendered the most efficient service, being constantly in front when we were advancing, and in the rear on the retreat.

Before reaching the town (1 mile distant), the command was put in order, and marched through the streets in perfect order at a walk, with the exception of a few stragglers. I placed the command in the next good position for defense, 2-1/2 miles from Somerset, where I awaited the advance of the enemy for three hours – until night. They advanced cautiously, threw a few shells, skirmished lightly, and then retired. At nightfall I withdrew my command, excepting a rear guard. As there was but one ferry-boat at Stigall’s Ferry, I ordered Colonel Morrison with his regiment 3 miles below to Newell’s Ferry.

By sunrise the next day the battery, Second Tennessee, and Sixteenth Battalion had all crossed, excepting some 20 horses. Colonel Morrison also lost about the same number of his horses in crossing. The enemy appeared about 8 o’clock, but in no great force.

 The entire lost of my brigade in killed, wounded, and missing during the expedition will be slightly over 200 men, being greatest in the First Louisiana. The enemy is reported to have buried 80 of his men, but this is mere rumor. His loss, however, must have been heavy, as shown by his want of readiness in following us up. During the expedition we took and paroled 178 prisoners from the enemy.

As regards the object of the expedition (the beef-cattle), the agents found many less in the counties we entered than had been represented. This was because large numbers had recently been driven out by the agents of the United States Government. We started with about 750, and crossed over the river 537.

In the difficult matter of crossing the command, I wish especially to bring to your notice Lieut. Tucker Randolph, acting on my staff. By his personal efforts during the whole night he rendered such service as commanded the admiration of all who saw him. During the action of the morning, this officer and Lieutenants (J.F.) Ransom and (George) Yoe, and Volunteer Aides D. Henley Smith and D.C. Freeman, jr., were always in the thickest of the fight, bearing orders with promptness and coolness, and doing all they could to encourage the men.

For Colonel Scott’s operations, I refer you to the accompanying report. Touching this curious document, I have only to say that I cannot but admire the ingenuity with which Colonel Scott has attempted to account for disobedience of orders and dilatoriness of action, which, it is my sincere belief, lost us this fight.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. PEGRAM,

Brigadier-General, Provisional Army Confederate States.

Capt. J.G. MARTIN,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Dept. of East Tennessee, Knoxville

Fight at Monticello, Kentucky May 1, 1863

REBEL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE

  Early on the morning of the first instant, Colonel Morrison, then commanding our brigade at Albany, Kentucky, received despatches from Colonel Chenault, at Monticello, to the effect that he was holding the enemy in check, that their force consisted of only three regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, including four pieces of artillery, and if he, Colonel Morrison, would come to their assistance they could capture the entire command, or run them into the river. Colonel Morrison immediately ordered the brigade in the direction of Monticello in quick-time. Though Chenault had long since retreated from every position he held, from Monticello back to where the Albany road leaves the Jamestown road, had fallen back nine miles, thus cutting off all communication with Colonel Morrison and the force on the Jamestown road. Captain Day's battalion was the advance. He, true to the instincts of a cautious commander, ordered two advance- guards. Lieutenant Gibson, commanding the first, was cut off and made his way to Chenault. The second was fired into, when the battalion was about-faced, and, whilst forming in a field adjacent that one in which they were marching, the Yankees made an attempt to charge their line, which was responded to by a volley of Minie-balls, when the order was given by the valiant and chivalrous Day to charge their advancing column, which they did in magnificent style. If ever blue bellies took to their heels, they did. They never stopped until they got to a woodland one mile distant.
  Colonel Morrison ordered back to the left Day's battalion and moved forward the artillery, Hincel's battery. The lines of the enemy were then within four hundred yards of our lines. Lieutenant Ramsey opened on them with deadly effect ~ every shot penetrated their lines. They soon left the field, followed by bombs of cool and intrepid Ramsey.
  The artillery in connection with Day's battalion forced the enemy back on their right and from our left, when they attempted to turn our right flank. Major Cobb had been sent to protect our right, but found the enemy occupying the hills commanding the road, and was forced to take position some distance from the road. The enemy coming up on our centre, Major Cobb was ordered to hold his position, as that was considered the only safe way to take out our artillery. But before the despatch was received by the Major, he was forced from his position with the enemy following him. Colonel Morrison was then completely flanked, though he was prepared to drive back the enemy on the centre, should they continue to advance. The battery occupied in eminence commanding the road for some distance. The First Georgia, Major Davis was in front Colonel Carter was ordered up, but did not hare time to take his position; Day's battalion was on the extreme left. Colonel Morrison, under the circumstances, was ordered to fall back in the direction of Travisville, as the enemy were crossing the river at Greary Creek, only a few miles below, with two regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and a heavy battery of artillery.
  During the evening, Chenault sent a despatch to Colonel Morrison, requesting reinforcements, as the enemy were pressing him. Colonel Carter was detached and ordered to his relief. He came to Travisville, and lo Chenault had sent Major Coff's command and the First Louisiana to that point, whilst he and Cluke struck a "bee line" in the direction of Middle Tennessee ~ without notifying Colonel Morrison or the reenforcements of his having left the position he had been holding that evening.
  Our brigade came through from the Albany road to Travisville unmolested but not whipped, for we had maintained our position and forced the enemy from theirs. Stragglers who were prejudiced against Colonel Morrison, and were too cowardly to remain in the field, skulked off to East-Tennessee to tell the tales of disaster and scandal.
  Our loss was two killed, nine wounded, and three prisoners. The loss of the enemy most have been from fifteen to twenty killed, aside from many wounded. Though the enemy shelled the brigade with four pieces of artillery for near an hour, they never forced back the brigade. Their entire force must have consisted of six or seven thousand, mostly mounted infantry, as there was a heavy force on both roads.
   At Hernden's we met the long looked for Pegram, who would have been greeted with many cheers but for the timidity of the men. All hearts seemed buoyed up by his arrival.
  He carries with him confidence wherever he goes. His appearance inspires his command with a feeling of confidence and success. He don t aspire for a commander of superior skill and ability. He has just returned from an arduous trip to Richmond, where he has been procuring arms and ammunition for his brigade. He will soon have his command the best armed of any in the confederate army.

Memphis Appeal

Here is a report from Mrs. Martha Vaughn and Mrs. Louisa Jackson during a hearing for them to receive relief from the Government after the war. They describe their experiences during March of 1863 with Gen. Pegram and his men.

The description of their experiences with the Confederates is during Pegram's Kentucky Raid. The First Tennessee Cavalry were under General Pegram during March of 63'.
This is interesting, because it describes what the civilians were experiencing during the war. Even though they were "Yankee Women", it is most likely what the Southern women were experiencing at the hands of the Federals.

Gen. John Pegram was a poor leader of volunteers and a mediocre tactical commander.

Of all the Generals that my Great, Great Grandfather rode under, he only mentioned one by name..... General John Hunt Morgan. I've always wondered why. You can read about it HERE

The 1st Tennessee Cavalry skirmish at Hickman Covered Bridge or Wernwag Bridge during Pegram's Kentucky Raid.

MARCH 28, 1863

 While foraging for cattle, Pegram’s Cavalry encountered and skirmished with Yankees on March 28th at Hickman’s Bridge. Then, narrowly evading the closely following 44th and 45th Regiments Ohio Infantry, they continued to rustle cattle until they had rounded up about 750 head. Bragg was relying on beef to keep the Army of Tennessee supplied with nourishing food. Pegram’s Cavalry had herded 537 of the cattle across the Cumberland River when their luck ran out.

The Hickman Covered Bridge, constructed in 1838, was the longest cantilever wooden bridge in the U.S. It was also the only bridge across the steep-banked Kentucky River in central Kentucky during the Civil War. The bridge was torn down in the 1930's after the steel truss bridge was completed. Only the stone abutments remain today. It was designed by Lewis Wernwag and is also known locally as the Wernwag Bridge.