Blue Springs ~ Oct. 10, 1863
The Union campaigns for Chattanooga and Knoxville were intended to be
mutually supportive. Burnside’s efforts were planned to threaten Bragg’s
right and rear thereby creating a diffusion of Confederate strength. In
an effort to affect the unification of Union forces Burnside has pushed
cavalry forward as far as Cleveland. The Confederate victory at
Chickamauga dashed any hopes of a quick unification and following the
battle Burnside was forced to retract his dangerously exposed forward
elements to the vicinity of Loudon.
Before Longstreet’s expedition against Knoxville got underway Burnside was busy expanding his position in the far eastern portion of Tennessee. Not content to simply wait out developments he sent BG Samuel Carter’s cavalry to secure the avenues of approach from Virginia and, if possible seize the important salt works at Abington. By coincidence the remaining Confederate division in the area, under MG Robert Ransom, was moving to interdict the Union supply line at Cumberland Gap. Ransom sent BG John S. Williams ahead with his troopers “to cover a movement…upon Cumberland Gap”. The opposing riders made initial contact in a meeting engagement on 3 October at Blue Springs, Tennessee. Both sides recoiled from the initial contact and spent the better part of the next week sparring with skirmishers and awaiting reinforcements.
Unfortunately for Williams his aggressiveness had moved his force too far ahead of and without adequate support. MG Ransom had not planned on advancing beyond Greenville and sent an order for Williams to assume command of all troops lest communication be severed between them. Williams mistakenly believed that the advance on Cumberland Gap would continue while he occupied the Federal troops at Blue Springs. Carter had no such trouble understanding his role. Burnside was personally leading a cavalry division and troops from Ferraro’s infantry division to his assistance. Attempting to match the extension of the ever growing Union line Williams extended his force into a position that covered over two miles. The Confederate defense was stretched until it comprised “nothing but a line of skirmishers.” On October 10th, after a reconnaissance by Chief Engineer, Captain Orlando Poe, the Union attack was launched at the Confederate center while cavalry, under Colonel Foster, attempted to gain their rear by sweeping around the right flank of Williams’ position. The Union attack pushed to the very rear of the Confederate line before being repelled by a barrage from a judiciously placed battery. Foster’s column did not make it into position in time to render assistance or cut off the line of retreat. The Union forces fled under the deluge of canister. Darkness and the absence of Foster’s men allowed Williams to conduct a retreat.
After the battle Williams discovered the expedition to Cumberland Gap had been cancelled and his fight had been unnecessary. All that remained to be done was to march out of Tennessee to safety. After uniting with a small force under BG Alfred E. Jackson at Greenville they began their escape. In the darkness the artillery took a wrong turn and while the main column waited for them to catch up the Federal troopers caught them at Rheatown and again on the 13th at Blountsville. These small actions delayed but did not stop the retreat into Virginia. Losses for the unnecessary fight totaled 216 Confederates and 100 Federals. As a postscript to the affair Williams requested and was granted relief from command.
Before Longstreet’s expedition against Knoxville got underway Burnside was busy expanding his position in the far eastern portion of Tennessee. Not content to simply wait out developments he sent BG Samuel Carter’s cavalry to secure the avenues of approach from Virginia and, if possible seize the important salt works at Abington. By coincidence the remaining Confederate division in the area, under MG Robert Ransom, was moving to interdict the Union supply line at Cumberland Gap. Ransom sent BG John S. Williams ahead with his troopers “to cover a movement…upon Cumberland Gap”. The opposing riders made initial contact in a meeting engagement on 3 October at Blue Springs, Tennessee. Both sides recoiled from the initial contact and spent the better part of the next week sparring with skirmishers and awaiting reinforcements.
Unfortunately for Williams his aggressiveness had moved his force too far ahead of and without adequate support. MG Ransom had not planned on advancing beyond Greenville and sent an order for Williams to assume command of all troops lest communication be severed between them. Williams mistakenly believed that the advance on Cumberland Gap would continue while he occupied the Federal troops at Blue Springs. Carter had no such trouble understanding his role. Burnside was personally leading a cavalry division and troops from Ferraro’s infantry division to his assistance. Attempting to match the extension of the ever growing Union line Williams extended his force into a position that covered over two miles. The Confederate defense was stretched until it comprised “nothing but a line of skirmishers.” On October 10th, after a reconnaissance by Chief Engineer, Captain Orlando Poe, the Union attack was launched at the Confederate center while cavalry, under Colonel Foster, attempted to gain their rear by sweeping around the right flank of Williams’ position. The Union attack pushed to the very rear of the Confederate line before being repelled by a barrage from a judiciously placed battery. Foster’s column did not make it into position in time to render assistance or cut off the line of retreat. The Union forces fled under the deluge of canister. Darkness and the absence of Foster’s men allowed Williams to conduct a retreat.
After the battle Williams discovered the expedition to Cumberland Gap had been cancelled and his fight had been unnecessary. All that remained to be done was to march out of Tennessee to safety. After uniting with a small force under BG Alfred E. Jackson at Greenville they began their escape. In the darkness the artillery took a wrong turn and while the main column waited for them to catch up the Federal troopers caught them at Rheatown and again on the 13th at Blountsville. These small actions delayed but did not stop the retreat into Virginia. Losses for the unnecessary fight totaled 216 Confederates and 100 Federals. As a postscript to the affair Williams requested and was granted relief from command.
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